We introduce a model of anonymous games with the player dependent action sets. We propose several learning procedures based on the well-known Fictitious Play and Online Mirror Descent and prove their convergence to equilibrium under the classical monotonicity condition. Typical examples are first-order mean field games.
Introduction
Mean field games (MFGs) are symmetric differential games with an infinite number of non-atomic players. The model was first introduced simultaneously by Lasry, Lions ([13] , [14] ) and Huang, Caines, Malhamé ( [11] , [12] ). In the game, each player chooses a control and incurs a cost depending on their control and the evolving distribution of all the other players' states. More formally, a typical player chooses a path γ : [0, T ] → R d , γ(0) = x via a control dγ t = α t dt and incurs the cost:
where (m t ) t∈[0,T ] ⊆ P(R d ) is the evolving distribution of other players. The Lagrangian L : R d × R d → R captures the running cost depending on the velocity and f, g : R d × P(R d ) → R are the couplings describing the interaction cost of the player with the distribution of the other players. The optimal control of a player can be obtained by solving the Hamilton-Jacobi equation: −∂ t u + H(x, ∇u(t, x)) = f (x, m t ), u(T, x) = g(x, m T ) with H(x, p) = − inf v∈R d p, v + L(x, v). The desired optimal control will be computed as α(t, x) = −D p H(x, ∇u(t, x)).
If every player chooses their optimal control, the evolving distribution of players is given by the Fokker-Planck equation:
Hence the notion of Nash Equilibrium (or stability) is captured by the system of coupled HamiltonJacobi (backward) and Fokker-Planck (forward) equations written above.
The equilibrium configuration in MFGs is quite complicated and its occurrence requires a huge amount of information and a large degree of cooperation between players. The question of formation of equilibrium arises naturally. Thus, one would guess that the MFG equilibrium is justifiable because there is a reasonable way of adapting (or learning) of players via observation and revision of the beliefs about the other players' behavior.
There are several learning procedures in games with finitely many players and/or a finite number of actions per player (see for example the monograph [9] ). Here we extend two of the most known of them to nonatomic games with continuous action sets: Fictitious Play (Brown [5] ) and Online Mirror Descent (Nemirovski, Yudin [20] ). In the current article, our main purpose is to prove the convergence of these procedures to Nash equilibrium in first-order MFGs; however, since the approach can be used for a larger class of games, we work under a general framework.
Anonymous games model the conflict situations where the dependency of the costs of the players to the action of their adversaries, are through the distribution of their chosen actions. The population game is a class of anonymous games with a set of of non-atomic players who choose among a finite number of actions (see for example [10] ). Mas-Collel [16] proposed a type of anonymous games with a continuum of players where actions are chosen from an identical set and the cost functions depend on the players' types. Our approach here is different; in the sense that actions may be chosen from different sets, but the cost functions are identical. For example this is the case in first-order MFGs; the players choose the paths with fixed (player dependent) initial positions as their actions, and the cost function is identical for all players.
In nonatomic games, Nash equilibria are defined up to a zero-measure set of players, i.e. the infinitesimal subsets which has no effect on the whole result of the game. Similar to the previous works (Schmeidler [24] , Mas-Collel [16] ) we employ a fixed point theorem to infer the existence of equilibrium under continuity and compactness.
Here we work under a well-known monotonicity condition introduced in game theory by Rosen [22] . The strict monotonicity yields the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium (Haufbauer, Sandholm [10] , Blanchet, Carlier [3] ). A similar definition appears in MFG (Lasry, Lions [13] , [14] ) which also implies the uniqueness of equilibrium. In anonymous games with (not necessarily strict) monotone costs, equilibrium uniqueness is a direct consequence of monotonicity and the "unique minimiser" condition.
Haufbauer, Sandholm [10] introduced the stable games as the population games with monotone costs. They prove the convergence of many learning dynamics including Best Response Dynamic, Replicator Dynamic, ... to the unique equilibrium. Their techniques have inspired our approach of the convergence results for Fictitious Play (Section 3) which is nothing but a discrete version of the best response dynamic.
As introduced by Brown [5] and Robinson [21] , fictitious play describes a learning procedure in which a fixed game is played over and over in repeated discrete rounds. At every round, each player sets their belief as the empirical frequency of play of the player's opponents, and then chooses its best action with respect to this belief. Convergence to a Nash equilibrium has been proved for different classes of finite games, for example potential games (Monderer, Shapley [19] ), zero sum games (Robinson [21] ) and 2 × 2 games (Miyasawa [18] ). Cardaliaguet, Hadikhanloo [8] proved the convergence of fictitious play in first and second order potential MFGs. Our approach here covers a different class of first-order MFGs, i.e. the ones with monotone costs.
The second procedure we consider is Online Mirror Descent (OMD). The method was first introduced by Nemirovski, Yudin [20] , as a generalization of standard gradient descent. The form of the algorithm is closely related to the notion of No-Regret procedures in Online Optimization. A good explanatory introduction can be found in Shalev Shwartz [23] . Roughly speaking, the procedure deals with two variables, a primal one and a dual one. They are revised at every round; the dual is revised by using the sub-gradient of the objective function and the primal is obtained by a quasi projection via a strongly convex penalty function on the convex domain. Mertikopolous [17] proved the convergence of OMD in a large class of games with convex action sets. Here we examine the convergence properties of OMD in monotone anonymous games with a possibly infinite number of players.
In the proof of convergence of both procedures to the Nash equilibrium, we define a value φ n ∈ R, n ∈ N measuring how much the actual behavior at step n is far from being an equilibrium; in Fictitious Play the quantity φ n is defined by the best response function and in OMD by using the Fenchel coupling. Then we prove lim n→∞ φ n = 0 that gives our desired convergence toward the equilibrium.
Here is how the paper is organized: in Section 2 a general model of anonymous game is proposed. The notion of Nash equilibrium is reviewed and the existence is proved under general continuity conditions. Then we introduce the definition of monotonicity in terms of the cost function, and its consequence on the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium. Section 3 is devoted to the definition of fictitious play and its convergence under Lipschitz conditions. Section 4 deals with the online mirror descent algorithm and its convergence. Section 5 shows that the first-order MFG can be considered as an example of anonymous games and shows that the previous results can be applied under suitable conditions. For sake of completeness, we provide in the Appendix some disintegration theorems which are used in the proofs.
Anonymous Games

Model
Let us introduce our general model of anonymous game G. For a measure space X let P(X) denotes the set of probability measures on X. Let I be the set of players and λ ∈ P(I) a prior non-atomic probability measure on I modeling the repartition of players on I. Let V be a measure space. For every player i ∈ I, let A i ⊂ V be the action set of i. Define the set of admissible profiles of actions
We identify the action profiles up to λ−zero measure subsets of I, i.e. Ψ 1 = Ψ 2 iff Ψ 1 (i) = Ψ 2 (i) for λ-almost every i ∈ I. The induced measure of a typical profile Ψ ∈ A on the set of actions, that captures the portion of players who have chosen a given subset of actions, is denoted by Ψ♯λ ∈ P(V ). More precisely, Ψ♯λ is the push-forward of measure of λ by application Ψ, that is for every measurable set B ⊆ V we have Ψ♯λ(B) = λ(Ψ −1 (B)). Since the set of Ψ♯λ for all admissible profiles Ψ, may be different from P(V ), it is sufficient to work with:
For every i ∈ I let c i : A → R be the cost payed by player i. We call the game anonymous, if for every player i ∈ I, there exists J i :
. In other words, J i (a, η) captures the cost endured by a typical player i ∈ I, whose action is a ∈ A i while facing the distribution of actions η ∈ P(V ) chosen by other players. We consider here anonymous games where the players have identical cost function, i.e. there is J : V × P G (V ) → R such that for every i ∈ I we have J i = J. We use the following notation for referring to such game: 
Nash Equilibria
Inspired from the notion of Nash equilibrium in non-atomic games (see Schmeidler [24] , Mas-Collel [16] ), we omit the effect of zero measure subsets of players in the definition of equilibria: Definition 2.1. a profileΨ ∈ A is called a Nash equilibrium if
The corresponding distributionη =Ψ♯λ is called a Nash (or equilibrium) distribution.
One can note that the definition of Nash equilibrium highly depends on the prior distribution of players i.e. λ. The following Theorem gives a sufficient condition under which the game possesses at least one equilibrium. Let I be a topological and V be a metric space (with B(I), B(V ) as their σ−fields). Suppose the A i 's are uniformly bounded for λ-almost every i ∈ I, i.e. there exist M > 0, v ∈ V such that:
This condition gives us P G (V ) ⊆ P 1 (V ) where:
endowed with the metric:
For technical reasons we work with closure convex hull of P G (V ) i.e. cov(P G (V )).
Definition 2.2. We say G = (I, λ, V, (A i ) i∈I , J) satisfies the Unique Minimiser condition, if for every η ∈ cov(P G (V )), there exists I η ⊆ I with λ(I \ I η ) = 0, such that for all i ∈ I η there is exactly
Informally, the definition says facing to every distribution of actions, (almost) every player has a unique best response.
• it is upper semi continuous i.e. the graph
• it is lower semi continuous i.e. for every open set
For more detailed theorems about set valued maps, see [1] .The following Theorem asserts sufficient conditions for existence of at least a Nash equilibrium:
J) be an anonymous game. Suppose the following conditions (H) hold: (i) the correspondence A : I → V, A(i) = A i is continuous and compact valued, (ii) There is an extension
Then G will admit at least a Nash equilibrium.
Assumptions (i − iv) provide enough continuity and compactness conditions we need for the fixed point theorem. The assumption (v) allows us to prove the existence of pure Nash equilibrium. In addition, it is crucial for the uniqueness of equilibrium and convergence results in learning procedures that we will propose. So we add it here as an assumption for being coherent in the entire article. Before we start the proof let us provide some lemmas which will be used here and in the rest of paper:
Lemma 2.1. Define the best response correspondence as follows Proof. Fix η ∈ cov(P G (V )). According to the unique minimiser condition there exists I η ⊆ I with λ(I \ I η ) = 0, such that BR(i, η) is singleton for every i ∈ I η . We will show the continuity of the restricted best response function BR(·, η) : I η → V which completes our proof. Consider i, i n ∈ I η such that i n → i. Set a n = BR(i n , η). The set {a n } n∈N is precompact since A : I → V is a compact valued correspondence and hence
If the (H) conditions hold, then for every
So there is a sub-sequence {a n k } k∈N such that lim k→∞ a n k =ã. We haveã ∈ A i since the correspondence A : I → V is upper semi continuous and a n ∈ A in . By definition J(a n , η) = Min(i n , η) which gives:
since the Min function is continuous. It yieldsã = BR(i, η). So every accumulation point of {a n } n∈N should be BR(i, η) which shows a n → BR(i, η).
Lemma 2.2. Define the best response distribution function
Θ : cov(P G (V )) → P G (V ) as follows: Θ(η) = BR(·, η)♯λ, for every η ∈ cov(P G (V )).
If the (H) conditions hold then Θ is continuous.
Proof. Let η n → η. If J = I η ∩ n∈N I ηn then we have λ(I \ J) = 0. One can show as for Lemma 2.1 that for every i ∈ J:
Since the A i 's are uniformly bounded for λ−almost every i ∈ J, the dominated Lebesgue convergence Theorem implies
Proof of Theorem 2.1. Consider the best response distribution function Θ defined in Lemma 2.2. We have by definition
which implies that the image of Θ is precompact. Since Θ is continuous (Lemma 2.2) and cov(P G (V )) is convex, by the Schauder's fixed point theorem, there isη ∈ cov(P G (V )) such that
This meansΨ is the desired Nash equilibrium.
Anonymous Games with Monotone Cost
Here we give a definition of monotonicity and its additional consequences on the structure of the game and its equilibria.
and it is strict monotone if the later inequality holds strictly for η = η ′ .
Intuitively, this condition describes the aversion of the players for choosing actions that are chosen by many of players i.e. congestion avoiding effect. In other words, on average the players dislike the crowded actions.
Remark 2.1. If J is monotone and ifΨ ∈ A is a Nash equilibrium, then for every Ψ ∈ A we have:
On the other hand
by the definition of push-forward measures. SinceΨ is an equilibrium, for λ-almost every i ∈ I, we have J(Ψ(i),η) − J(Ψ(i),η) ≥ 0, which gives our result.
The strict monotonicity yields the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium in different frameworks, e.g. Haufbauer, Sandholm [10] , Blanchet, Carlier [3] , Lasry, Lions [13] . In the following we show that in Anonymous Games, the Monotonicity and Unique Minimiser condition are sufficient for the uniqueness of the equilibrium. Theorem 2.2. Consider a game G = (I, λ, V, (A i ) i∈I , J). Then the game G admits at most one Nash equilibrium if J is monotone and G satisfies the Unique Minimiser condition.
Proof. Let Ψ 1 , Ψ 2 ∈ A be two Nash equilibria. We will show that Ψ 1 (i) = Ψ 2 (i) for λ-almost every i ∈ I. Set η i = Ψ i ♯λ for i = 1, 2. Since Ψ 1 is an equilibrium, we have:
On the other hand:
which gives:
Hence by monotonicity of J we should have the equality in the later inequalities. So for λ-almost every i ∈ I, one has J(Ψ 1 (i), η 1 ) = J(Ψ 2 (i), η 1 ) which gives our result since Ψ 1 (i) ∈ A i is the unique minimisers of J(·, η 1 ) on A i so Ψ 1 (i) = Ψ 2 (i) for λ-almost every i ∈ I. 
Fictitious Play in Anonymous Games
Here we introduce a learning procedure similar to the Fictitious Play defined by Brown [5] and prove its convergence to the unique Nash equilibrium when the game is monotone.
Let G = (I, λ, V, (A i ) i∈I , J). For technical reasons, we suppose that conditions (H) hold throughout this section. Suppose G is being played repeatedly on discrete rounds n = 1, 2, . . .. At every round, the players set their belief equals to the average of the action distribution observed in the previous rounds and then react their best to such belief. At the end of the round players revise their beliefs by a new observation. More formally, consider Ψ 1 ∈ A,η 1 = η 1 = Ψ 1 ♯λ ∈ P(V ) an arbitrary initial belief. Construct recursively (Ψ n , η n ,η n ) ∈ A × P(V ) × P(V ) for n = 1, 2, . . . as follows:
One should notice that by assumption (H)(v) and Lemma 2.1 the expressions in (i, ii) are well defined. We will show now that this procedure converges to the Nash Equilibrium when G is monotone.
Theorem 3.1. Consider an Anonymous game G = (I, λ, V, (A i ) i∈I , J) with a monotone Cost. Suppose that exists C > 0 such that for all a, b ∈ V, η, η ′ ∈ cov(P G (V )):
Construct (Ψ n , η n ,η n ) ∈ A × P(V ) × P(V ) for n ∈ N by applying the fictitious play procedure proposed in (2) . Then:
is the unique Nash equilibrium distribution.
Inspired from [10] , the proof requires several steps. The key idea is to use the quantity φ n ∈ R defined by
Since the best response distribution ofη n is η n+1 , the quantity φ n describes how muchη n is far from being an equilibrium. By using monotonicity and the regularity conditions, one gets
for suitable {ǫ n } n∈N such that lim n→∞ ǫ n = 0. We show the later inequality is sufficient to prove lim n→∞ φ n = 0 and then we conclude that the accumulation points ofη n , η n is the equilibrium distributionη. As one will see, the unique minimiser assumption plays a key role in Lemma 3.2 and hence in our main result.
Lemma 3.1. Consider a sequence of real numbers {φ n } n∈N such that lim inf n φ n ≥ 0. If there exists a real sequence {ǫ n } n∈N such that lim n→∞ ǫ n = 0 and :
Proof. Let b n = nφ n for every n ∈ N. We have:
which proves lim n→∞ φ n = 0.
Lemma 3.2. Let (η n ) n∈N be defined by (2) . Then
Proof. Let M > 0, v ∈ V be chosen from (1). For every 1-Lipschitz continuous map f : V → R we have:
By the definition we have:
So we can write
since f is arbitrary. For the second part of the lemma, let us consider the best reply distribution function Θ defined in Lemma 2.2. Since Θ is continuous (Lemma 2.2) and cov(P G (V )) is compact, there exists a non decreasing continuity modulus
Since for all n ∈ N we haveη n ∈ cov(P G (V )) and Θ(η n ) = η n+1 we have
It gives our desired result since d 1 (η n ,η n+1 ) = O(1/n).
The proof of previous lemma relies heavily on the unique minimizer assumption. Instead without it, one cannot conclude that η n , η n+1 are close even ifη n ,η n+1 are so. Even forη n =η n+1 , one might have very different best responses η n and η n+1 .
Proof of Theorem 3.1. Let {φ n } n∈N be defined by:
We have φ n ≥ 0 for all n ∈ N. Indeed, rewriting the definition of φ n , we have:
and the positiveness comes from the definition of the best response. We now prove that exists C > 0 such that:
Let us rewrite φ n+1 − φ n = A + B, where:
We have:
since by (3) and Lemma 3.2 there exists C such that the function J(·,η n ) − J(·,η n+1 ) : V → R is a C/n−Lipschitz continuous function. Let us rewrite the expression A as follows:
since by (3) and Lemma 3.2 we have |J(a,
Then if we set ǫ n = C(d 1 (η n+1 , η n+2 ) + 1/n), by using the above inequalities for A, B, we have :
and the last inequality comes from the monotonicity assumption. By Lemmas 3.1, 3.2 inequality (4) implies φ n → 0. Let (η,η) ∈ P G (V ) × cov(P G (V )) be an accumulation point of the set {(η n+1 ,η n )} n∈N . We have η = Θ(η) due to the continuity of best response distribution function Θ (Lemma 2.2) and the fact that η n+1 = Θ(η n ). Take an arbitrary θ ∈ P G (V ). Since J is lower semi-continuous we have (see [2] section 5.1.1):
We rewrite the above inequality as follows: sinceη ∈ cov(P G (V )) by Corollary 6.1 we can disintegrate it with respect to (A i ) i∈I i.e. there are {η i } i∈I ⊆ P(V ) such that for λ−almost every i ∈ I we have supp(η i ) ⊂ A i and for every integrable function f : V → R:
, and for all Ψ ∈ A:
Combining the previouse equailities with (6), gives us:
In particular if Ψ = BR(·,η) we have:
which gives the equality by definition of best response action. So by unique minimizer we havē η i = δ BR(i,η) for λ−almost every i ∈ I. It meansη = BR(·,η)♯λ orη = Θ(η). Henceη = η and they are both equal toη ∈ P G (V ), the unique fixed point of Θ, or equivalently, the equilibrium distribution.
Online Mirror Descent
Here we investigate the convergence results by applying Online Mirror Descent (OMD) in anonymous games. The form of OMD algorithm is closely related to the online optimization and no regret notions. The reader can find a good explanatory note in [23] . The goal of the algorithm is to act optimally in online manner by somehow "minimising" a function that itself changes at each step. In the game framework it is the cost function; it changes due to change of the acions chosen by adverseries in each round. As one can notice in the following, we need the structure of vector space for the action sets.
Prelimineries
Before we propose the main OMD, let us review some definitions and lemmas. Proof. Since A is convex, for every ǫ ∈ (0, 1] we have (1 − ǫ)a 1 + ǫa 2 ∈ A. By definition:
So by combining the above inequalities:
After dividing the both sides by ǫ and then ǫ → 0 + we will get:
By exchanging the role of (a 1 , y 1 ) and (a 2 , y 2 ) we have:
It yields the desired result if we sum up the two later inequalities.
and set ∂F (a) ⊆ W * the set of all subgradients at a.
One can notice that if F : W → R is differentiable at a ∈ W then ∂F (a) = {DF (a)}.
OMD algorithm and convergence result
Consider an anonymous game G = (I, λ, V, (A i ) i∈I , J). Suppose that the following conditions hold:
• there is a normed vector space (W, · W ) such that
and let h : W → R be a K−strongly convex function for a real K > 0.
• for every i ∈ I the action sets A i are weakly closed in W and h is weakly lower semi-continuous and coercive (and hence Q A i is single valued),
• for every (a, η) ∈ W × P G (V ) the function J(·, η) : W → R is convex and exists a subgradient y(a, η) ∈ ∂ a J(·, η) ⊆ W * , Let {β n } n∈N be a sequence of real positive numbers. Set an arbitrary initial measurable functions Ψ 0 ∈ A, η 0 = Ψ 0 ♯λ, Φ 0 : I → W * . The following procedure (7) is called the Online Mirror Descent (OMD) on anonymous game G:
for every i ∈ I (iii) η n+1 = Ψ n+1 ♯λ. 
then η n = Ψ n ♯λ converges toη =Ψ♯λ whereη ∈ P G (V ) is the unique Nash equilibrium distribution.
The proof requires a few intermediate steps: In addition, if there is a constant C > 0 such that |a n − a n+1 | < C n then lim n→∞ a n = 0
Proof. See [19] . Lemma 4.3. For every y, z ∈ W * and any A ⊆ W we have :
Proof. The Lemma is obvious since
Proof of Theorem 4.1. LetΨ ∈ A be a Nash equilibrium profile. Define the real sequence {φ n } n∈N as follows:
We first show |φ n | < ∞. We have
In addition by (7)(i):
which proves |φ n | < ∞. By definition of Fenchel conjugate we have φ n ≥ 0. Let us compute the difference φ n+1 − φ n :
So from Lemma 4.3:
where α n = I y(Ψ n (i), η n ), Ψ n (i) −Ψ(i) dλ(i) and since by condition (8) we have:
From to the definition of the subgradient we have:
So:
by Remark 2.1. Since β n = 1 n we have:
and:
From the definition of subgradient:
The later and inequality (9) yield lim n→∞ ψ n = 0 by Lemma 4.2. Since P G (V ) is precompact, there exist a sequence {n i } i∈N ⊆ N and η ′ ∈ P G (V ) such that lim i→∞ η n i = η ′ . Since J(·,η) : V → R is lower semi-continuous, we have:
which yields η ′ =η due to the Corollary 6.1 and the definition of Nash equilibrium distribution. So every accumulation point of set {η n } n∈N ⊆ P G (V ) isη which gives lim n→∞ η n =η since P G (V ) is precompact.
Application to First Order Mean Field Games
Model
Let us define the first-order mean field games as special example of anonymous games proposed in section 1. Set I = R d with the usual topology as the set of players and m 0 ∈ P(I) a given Borel probability measure on
i.e. the action set of every player i ∈ R d is the paths with initial points equal to i and bounded L 2 −norm of velocity. We will explain how to choose M > 0 properly.
Let P(V ) be the set of Borel probability measures on V and set for every t ∈ [0, T ] the evaluation function e t : V → R d as e t (γ) = γ(t). The MFG cost function J : V × P(V ) → R is defined as follows:
It describes that a players choosing a path γ has to pay first for its velocity, by the map Lagrangian L : R d × R d → R, and second for his interaction with the population and congested areas, by the couplings f, g :
We call the Anonymous Game
defined above, a first-order mean field game. We suppose from now on, that the following conditions ( * ) hold:
i. m 0 has a compact support,
ii. for every
there exists a non-decreasing coercive map θ : R + → R + such that:
and the map θ satisfies the following growth condition:
iii. the couplings f, g are conitnuous and for every m ∈ P(R d ) the maps f (·, m), g(·, m) :
and there exist C, b > 0 such that:
The convexity of L(x, ·) implies that for every η ∈ P(V ) the global cost J(·, η) is lower semicontinuous. It can be shown (see [6] , Section 6) if condition ( * )(ii, iii) hold, then there is at least one minimizer of
where
is absolutely continuous and γ satisfies the Euler-Lagrange equation:
In addition by ( * )(iii) there is M (r) > 0 such that
for every solution of (11) with γ(0) = x and x ∈ B r (see [6] 
Then it can be shown (see [7] , section 4) that u(0, ·) : R d → R is Lipschitz continuous and if it is derivable at x ∈ R d then the solution of (11) satisfies
It is a classical ODE with initial values and hence it possesses a unique solution. In other words, the optimal trajectories are unique in the initial points where u(0, ·) is derivable i.e. almost everywhere since u(0, ·) is Lipschitz. It provides the unique minimizer condition for first-order MFGs. Moreover, we choose M in (10) equals to M (R) in (12) with
is precomact in V . For every η ∈ cov(P G (V )) we have supp(η) ⊆ S, so cov(P G (V )) is tight and hence it is precompact in (P 1 (V ), d 1 ). Under the conditions more restrictive than in ( * ), the first-order MFG system defined by a coupled Hamilton-Jacobi (backward) and Fokker-Planck (forward) equation:
has at least a weak solution i.e. there are u :
u is the unique semiconvex viscosity solution of (14)(i) and m solves (14) (ii) in distribution sense (see [7] , [13] ). After solving the MFG system, the equilibriumΨ ∈ A is obtained by:
and in addition e t ♯η = m t forη =Ψ♯m 0 . Lasry, Lions [13] have shown that MFG solution is unique if the couplings f, g are strictly monotone i.e. for all m = m ′ ∈ P(R d ) :
We prove that the uniqueness is a consequence of the monotonicity of the cost function J and unique minimizer condition: Proof. Let η 1 , η 2 ∈ P(V ). If we define m i,t = e t ♯η i for i = 1, 2 and t ∈ [0, T ], we then have:
since the couplings f, g are monotone. 
Fictitious Play in First Order MFG
The fictitious play in first-order MFG takes such form: for initial profile of actions
the players play as follows for round n = 1, 2, . . . :
where (i) holds for m 0 −almost every i ∈ R d . Here we apply the convergence result in fictitious play (Section 3) for monotone first-order MFG. We suppose the ( * ) (and hence (H)) conditions hold.
which means that for every x, x ′ ∈ R d we have
Similar inequalities hold with respect to g. We have: 
Online Mirror Descent in First Order MFG
Here we use the convergence result proved in Section 4 for the first-order MFG which have a monotone convex cost function J. So let us suppose that the couplings f, g are monotone and L(·, ·), f (·, m), g(·, m) are convex for every m ∈ P(R d ). It easily yields that J is monotone (by Lemma 5.1) and for every η ∈ P(V ), the function J(·, η) : H 1 ([0, T ], R d ) → R is convex. Let us set W = H 1 ([0, T ], R d ) endowed with inner product:
We clearly have 
If in addition to the condition ( * )(ii, iii) we have:
then one can easily conclude by dominated Lebesgue convergence theorem that the function J(·, η) : W → R is differentiable for every η ∈ P(V ). So the sub-differential set is singleton i.e. ∂J(·, η)(γ) = {D γ J(γ, η)} ⊆ W * and the derivative is calculated by:
(L x (γ t ,γ t ) · z t + L v (γ t ,γ t ) ·ż t + f x (γ t , e t ♯η) · z t ) dt + g x (γ T , e T ♯η) · z T or according to our representation:
So by the computation in (17) the gradient ∇ γ J(γ, η) ∈ W is obtained as follows:
(L x (γ s ,γ s ) + f x (γ s , e s ♯η)) min(t, s) ds + The game satisfies the (H) conditions. By ( * )(ii) the derivatives f x (γ t , m), g x (γ t , m) are bounded by a power of γ H 1 . Then since the condition (18) holds, there are C ′ , α > 0 such that for λ−almost every i ∈ I:
So all of the conditions in Theorem 4.1 are satisfied and the desired convergence result holds.
